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## The Global Situation

Click on worldmaking.interconnections. Your screen fills with global flows.

Imagine a creek cutting through a hillside. As the water rushes down, it carves rock and moves gravel; it deposits silt on slow turns; it switches courses and breaks earth dams after a sudden storm. As the creek flows, it makes and remakes its channels.

Imagine a computer system, linking up internet users. Or a rush of immigrants across national borders. Or capital investments shuttled to varied off-shore locations. These world-making "flows," too, are not just interconnections but the recarving of channels and the remapping of the possibilities of geography.

Imagine the landscape nourished by the creek. Yet even beyond the creek's "flows," there are no stable landscape elements: Trees sprout up, transforming meadows into forests; cattle browse on saplings, spreading meadows past forest edges. Nor are forests and meadows the only way to divide up the landscape. Consider the perspective of the earthworm, looking for rich soils, or the weed, able to flourish in both meadow and forest, but only when each meets certain conditions. To tell the story of this landscape requires not only an appreciation of changing landscape elements but also of the partial, tentative, and shifting ability of the storyteller to identify elements at all.

Imagine ethnic groups, corporations, refugees, non-governmental organizations, nation states, consumers, social movements, media moghuls, trade organizations, social scientists, and international lawyers and bankers, among others, all swarming alongside forests and creeks and earthworms to compose the landscape, to define its elements and scales and carve its channels of flow and establish its units of historical agency. We live in a time of self-consciousness about units and scales: Where shall we draw the boundaries of regions? How are local communities composed? And, most important for this essay, what is this thing we call the globe? If social scientists have had a lot to say about these questions of late, so have other people. Contestants form and reform themselves in shifting alliances, mobilized for reasons of power or passion or discipline or dis-ease, and mounting campaigns for particular configurations of unit and scale. Some of the most excited campaigning in the last twenty-five years has concerned the globe, that planet-wide space for all humanity and its encompassing and enriching habitat. Moreover, in the last ten years, talk about the globe has heated up to the point that many commentators imagine a global era, a time in which no units or scales count for much except the globe. "Globalization," the process taking us into that era, has caught up enthusiasts ranging from corporate managers to social activists, from advertisers to cultural theorists.

For many years, the creek makes only gradual changes in the landscape. Then a storm sweeps the flux beyond its accustomed boundaries, shifting every bank and eddy. Trees are uprooted, and what was once on the right side is now on the left. So, too, the social world has shifted around us. Market enthusiasms have replaced communism; national governments prostrate themselves before international finance; social movements market "culture" on a global scale. How should social scientists analyze these changes? This question is muddled by the fact that social science changes too.

"Global" practices challenge social scientists to internationalize their venues, as North American and European scholars are brought into discussion with scholars from the South. Social science theories no longer take Western genealogies for granted, but require fluency with a wider range of perspectives, from Latin American dependency theories to South Asian subaltern studies. The excitement of this internationalization of scholarship encourages many of us to throw ourselves into endorsements of globalization as a multi-layered evolution, drawing us into the future. Sometimes our critical distance seems less useful than our participation. And yet, can we understand either our own involvement or the changing world without our critical skills? This essay argues that we cannot.

Consider another moment in which social science was remade together with the world: the period after World War II when social scientists were called upon to participate in the international project of modernization and development. Modernization frameworks brought together scholars, policy makers, politicians, and social activists in a common program for social betterment. It offered the hope of moving beyond the colonial segregation of Europeans and natives to a world in which every nation could aspire to the highest standards of livelihood and culture. Even social scientists who feared its destructiveness or despised its imperiousness thus came to imagine modernization as the world-making process of the times. The charisma of the notion of an era of globalization is comparable in many ways to the charm of modernization in that post-War period. Like modernization theory, the global-future program has swept together scholars and public thinkers to imagine a new world in the making. Do globalization theories contain similar pitfalls for engaged social scientists as modernization theory?

Modernization, like globalization, was seductive. It was many years before social scientists moved beyond endorsements, refusals, and reforms of modernization to describe modernization as a set of projects with cultural and institutional specificities and limitations. Only when the shine of modernization began to fade did scholars ask how it managed to capture the hopes and dreams of so many experts, how its formulae were communicated to such a variety of social groups and within such a diversity of situations, and how its features were transformed in the process for multiple uses. Recent literature on modernization in its guise as "development" for the Third World is exemplary in this regard. A number of analysts, including Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1990), have shown the discursive specificities of development, which often thrived more through the coherence of its internal logic than through any insight into the social situations in which it was expected to intervene. The commitment of experts to development drew material and institutional resources to its programs even when they were quite obviously destructive of the human well-being that formed its ostensible goal. Meanwhile, development was also reformulated through its constant negotiation and translation within particular settings, and it assumed multiple forms. Recent studies have shown how development policies diversified as they become entangled in regional political struggles (e.g., Peters 1994) and as they were reinterpreted in varied cultural settings (e.g., Pigg 1992). This rich literature has inspired new attention to the making of modernization. Its example can stimulate attention to the multiple projects of imagining and making globality.

Studies of modernization as a set of projects look in at least three directions. First,

analysts attend to the cultural specificity of commitments to modernization. They may make these commitments seem exotic to remove them from the reader's common sense. They explore the elements through which they make assumptions about the world. For example, modernization projects create notions of time through which groups and activities can be situated in relation to stories of progress. Second, analysts attend to the social practices, material infrastructure, cultural negotiations, institutions, and power relations through which modernization projects work--and are opposed, contested and reformulated. Modernization projects do their work through educational practices, military coercion, administrative policies, resource entitlements, community reorganization, and much more; these arenas and practices both make and are transformed by modernization. To examine the effects of modernization commitments requires attention to the social worlds both of and beyond modernization visions. Third, analysts use the promise of questions and dilemmas brought up in modernization programs without becoming caught in their prescriptions for social change. For example, through its emphasis on critical reflection as a mode of "modern" thought, modernization drew attention to the awkward relationship between representation and its object and to the craft and creativity through which social life must be described. Analysts of modernization projects make use of this insight without assuming the framework of progress that helped generate it.

These directions of analysis seem equally useful to understanding projects of imagining and making globality. Certainly, commitments to globalism are strange enough to warrant cultural analysis. Furthermore, as globalization becomes institutionalized as a program not only in the academy but in corporate policy, politics, and popular culture, it is important to attend to these sites to understand what projects of globalization do in the world--and what else goes on with and around them. Finally, I think there is enormous analytic promise in tracing global interconnections without subsuming them to any one program of global-future commitments. A global framework allows one to consider the making and remaking of geographical and historical agents and the forms of their agency in relation to movement, interaction, and shifting, competing claims about community, culture, and scale. Places are made through their connections with each other, not their isolation. This kind of analysis seems too important to relegate it only to studying the best-promoted "global" trends; indeed, among other uses, we can employ it to specify the uneven and contested global terrain of global promotion.

In this essay, I use these three directions of analysis to learn something about social science commitments to the newly emerging significance of a global scale. First, I examine the charisma of social science globalisms. By "globalism," I refer to endorsements of the importance of the global. I want to know how the idea of the global has worked to excite and inspire social scientists. I pick out a number of elements that add to this charisma and argue for their obfuscating as well as enlivening features.

Second, to see how this charisma produces effects in the world, I examine reading and discussion practices in the field of anthropology, as these produce and reproduce commitments to globalization. As an observer, I try to track the excitement of my students and colleagues; yet as a participant, I want to argue for a better use of the charisma of global frameworks.

Thus, third, I show how questions about global interconnections might be

detached from the most problematic globalist commitments to offer a more nuanced and critical analysis of culture and history, including recent shifts that have turned attention to the global. I argue that we can investigate globalist projects and dreams without assuming that they remake the world just as they want. The task of understanding planet-wide interconnections requires locating and specifying globalist projects and dreams, with their contradictory as well as charismatic logics and their messy as well as effective encounters and translations.

Globalization draws our enthusiasm because it helps us imagine interconnection, travel, and sudden transformation. Yet it also draws us inside its rhetoric until we take its claims for true descriptions. In the imagery with which I began, flow is valorized but not the carving of the channel; national and regional units are mapped as the baseline of change without attention to their shifting and contested ability to define the landscape. We lose sight of the coalitions of claimants, and their partial and shifting claims. We lose touch with the material and institutional components through which powerful and central sites are constructed from which convincing claims about units and scales can be made. We describe the landscape imagined within these claims rather than the culture and politics of scale making. This essay suggests approaches to the study of the global that seem to me to hold on to the excitement of this endorsement of planetary interconnection without trading our critical stance for globalist wishes and fantasies.

### Hurting through space

To invoke the global at the turn of the second millennium is to call attention to the speed and density of interconnections among people and places. In this imagery, the planet overwhelms us in its rush toward the future; we must either sit on top of it or be swamped and overcome.

It seems worth hesitating for a moment to consider the difference between this aggressive globe, hurtling through space, and an only slightly earlier fragile planet, floating gently in its cloud cover. This fertile yet vulnerable green planet was conjured by the global environmentalism that emerged in the United States and Europe at the end of the 1960s and blossomed in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. As Yaakov Garb (1990) has shown, the global environmentalists' globe gained its power from the visual image of the earth first seen in photographs from space in the 1960s; this awe-inspiring image was repeated in many forms and contexts to mobilize sentiment for that kind of nature that most needed our respect, love, and protection.

It became possible to imagine this nature as extending across the planet because global environmentalism brought together the universalist morality of 1960s social justice politics and the transboundary expertise of an emergent ecological science (Taylor and Buttel 1992; Haas 1992). Politics and science, working together, conjured an earth worth studying, managing, and fighting for at multiple, but compatibly stratified scales and levels of advocacy and analysis.

Global environmentalism also participated in building another image of the global, in which globality represented the goal of a process of building transnational political and cultural ties. Beginning most intensely in the 1980s, social movements--including environmentalism, human rights, indigenous rights, and feminist causes--extended themselves through non-governmental organizations; they sought to work around the restrictions of nation states by forging transnational lines of financial,

scientific, and political support (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Activists put pressure on their respective governments with these resources; national policies were also pressed to respond to international agreements. The global here is a never-ending process of "networking" and building lines of support. Annelise Riles (1998) has shown how the aesthetics of global network formation developed such charisma within non-governmental organizations that it became a major objective in itself. Global process here encourages participants to speak up, to learn from each other, and to extend themselves. But it does not yet push us over the edge of an evolutionary abyss.

It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that the process of "globalization," as the definitional characteristic of an era, became popular in the media and advertising. The triumph of the capitalist marketplace had been proclaimed with the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and enthusiasm ran high for national economic deregulation and privatization in the North and more thorough forms of structural adjustment in the South. In this atmosphere, "globalization" came to mean an endorsement of international free trade and the outlawing of protected or public domestic economies (Chomsky 1998). Yet the term came to encompass much more. Corporate reorganizations required not just markets but also the ability to transfer operations and finances transnationally to find the most profitable conditions; these kinds of corporate transfers, although reaching several decades back, became caught up in the talk of globalization. Furthermore, social commentators reminded the public that the new mobility of labor was tied to capital mobility and global market guarantees (e.g., Sassen 1998; Zavella). Cultural critics noted the enhanced circulation of Southern-based cultural forms--West African music, Hindi film, Thai cuisine--in wealthy Northern cities that support their development (e.g., Gates et al). A variety of public debates and discussions came to be seen as "globally" interconnected: not only labor-and-capital oriented fights about immigration, unionization, downsizing, subcontracting, and impoverishment, but also debates about the world-wide spread of U.S. media productions, the role of national governments, the dangers and promises of multiculturalism, and the growing influence and proper management of new computer-based communications technologies. Indeed, the popularity of "global" terms and approaches drew from their evocation of multiple causes, agendas, and historical layers of imagery.

At the turn of the century, then, globalism is multi-referential: part corporate hype and capitalist regulatory agenda, part cultural excitement, part social commentary and protest. Within this shifting agenda, several features attract and engage an expanding audience for imagining the globe: first, its futurism, that is, its ability not only to name an era but to predict its progress; second, its confluences of varied projects through which the populist and the corporate, the scientific and the cultural, the excluded margins and the newly thriving centers, all seemed wrapped up in the same energetic movement; and, third, its rhetoric of linkage and circulation as the overcoming of boundaries and restrictions, through which all this excitement appears positive for everyone involved. These elements are worth examining separately.

## FUTURISM

Globalization is a crystal ball that promises to tell us of an almost-but-not-quite-there globality. This is powerful stuff for experts, politicians, and policy makers. Social scientists are particularly caught by the force of this charisma. The rush of prescience

returns social science to the period after World War II, when the field charted the development of the new nations of the South, and, in the North, the welfare state. Since then, social scientists have been better known--like economists and sociologists--as technicians of the present, or--like anthropologists and geographers--as collectors of ancient survivals. Now the opportunity has come to look forward with a new expertise. The crystal ball inspires us to rush anxiously into the future, afraid to be left behind.

The future-orientation of this discussion of the global requires the assumption of newness. If global interconnections do not define the contemporary era, setting it off from the past, to examine these interconnections shows us complexity rather than direction. Analysts of globalization force attention to the break that differentiates the present from the past because in the context of that break can they see forward.

The assumption of newness has other benefits. It can help us see the distinctiveness of a historical moment. It can inspire a "bandwagon" effect in which unexpected and creative alliances among different kinds of analysts may be forged.

In this spirit, it can break up too-comfortably established fields, inspiring new forms of discussion.

However, the assumption of newness can also stifle other lines of inquiry and disallow questions about the construction of the field for which it forms the starting line. In history and anthropology, for example, the idea that global interconnections are old has only recently been revitalized, muffled as this idea was for much of the twentieth century by the draw of nationally contained legacies, in history, and functionally contained social worlds, in anthropology; it seems unfortunate to lose this insight so quickly.

Perhaps the worst fault of the assumption of global newness is that it erects stereotypes of the past that get in the way of appreciating both the past and the present. This fault has been particularly glaring in the discussion of the nation inspired by talk of globalization.

In interpreting the defeat of various national attempts to control financial capital, analysts have imagined an unprecedented world-historical defeat of the nation, as if nations, until now, were unquestioned, consistent, and everywhere hegemonic. Yet national control of finance may itself have been a recent, ephemeral product. After World War II, economic regulations emerging from the Bretton-Woods agreement made it possible for nation states to control domestic financial capital, providing funding for welfare states. An earlier free-flowing internationalization of finance was cut off, as national capitalisms were set in place (Helleiner 1993).

Similarly, political commitment to national territorial boundaries and the importance of regulating population movements across national borders has a particular history. The new nation states that emerged after World War II in Africa and Asia, for example, developed special concerns for territorial sovereignty to declare their autonomy from the colonial condition; their national histories and geographies stressed self-development, not regional and transregional flow.

To turn nationalist visions from this period into a description of a homogeneous past seems likely to lead to distortions.

Given long-term commitments in the humanities to tracing intellectual lineages and civilizational commitments, it is perhaps surprising that literary critics have embraced the assumption of era-making global newness to put together anthologies on

"the cultures of globalization" (Jameson and Miyoshi 1998).

The anthologies they have created are in many ways extremely exciting: Here are a variety of themes, a breadth of places discussed, and a diversity of scholars that form a striking intervention into the narrowly Western, textual orientation of most humanities. This is not scholarship as usual; it has the political energy and passion of cultural studies. This development is so important that it is awkward to say anything else. But I am suspicious of cultural stage theories, with their determinations of who is at the peak of human evolution and who will be left behind. Without denying their contribution, it may be useful to question how the articles in these anthologies are connected to each other. To discuss globalization, the editors make the a priori assumption of a cultural political era.

The era must have a cultural logic, and the descriptions of culture gathered in the book must form part of that logic.

I think we can discuss global projects, links, and situations with a better frame: one that recognizes the making and unmaking of claims about the global even as it examines the consequences of these powerful claims in the world we know, and one which recognizes new and surprising developments without declaring, by fiat, the beginning of an era. Yet global futurism is seductive. It can be conjured equally by a technical mathematics or by an enthusiastic and suggestive vagueness. Frederic Jameson is perhaps the most upfront about all this, claiming that questions about the definition of the global era to which he has devoted his book are not only premature but decidedly uncool (1998: xi). Surely, we will find that the disparate cultural and political processes we investigate in these times will turn out to be the trunk, limbs, and tail of that elephant not recognized as a single beast by the blind men. He disarms critics: Anyone who has questions about the elephant must certainly be a crumudgeonly old elephant hater, who believes that there is nothing new under the sun; this exhausts, for him, the options for dissent (1998a:54). And yet, might it not be a newly productive strategy to pay close and critical attention to these different limb-like global projects and agendas, to appreciate their articulations as well as their disengagements and mismatched encounters?

## CONFLATIONS

Jameson argues that globalization is best understood through the Hegelian dialectic: its ideological logic produces both a dark and a light side (1998a). This is a useful reminder that the global developments that we, as social commentators, find promising are often deeply connected to those we find dangerous. But why jump quite so quickly into the assumption that the vast array of transcommunal and transnational ideas and activities around us form a single ideological system? There are some important advantages. Overlaps among ideological projects produce an added intensity all around. When the machinery of corporate and state publicity has converged on a single image, it is doubly hard to avoid the sense of complicity, for better or worse. In analyzing recent developments, it would be silly to argue for autonomous institutional, or regional, or political-cause domains. It is clear that the appreciation of synergy among varied globalist projects is at the heart of the new enthusiasm about the globe. My point is that this very search for overlaps, alliances, collaborations, and complicities is one of the most important phenomena we could study. We might look at how particular projects become formulated, how they are tied and transformed in the process, and how they sometimes

interrupt each other despite themselves. The "globalization" that is formed from these hit-and-miss convergences would be considerably more unstable, and more interesting, than the one posited by any single claimant as a world-making system. One step in looking for this kind of globalization must be to recognize that there are varied agendas, practices, and processes that may or may not be deeply interconnected at a given historical moment.

Two recent studies of the cultural logic of global "network" formation are useful to compare in this regard. Roger Rouse (1997) analyses a series of advertisements produced for the telephone company MCI that promote the company's ability to build an interactive multimedia communications network. This communication network is advertised as part of a world-changing, future-making revamping of space and time, in which instantaneous communications within a personalized web of ties will replace geographically grounded routes and central-place hierarchies. The "network" MCI promotes is simultaneously the material technology of telephones, computers, and the like and the individualized, flexible, transnational set of contacts and associates citizens of the future will be able to maintain through these technologies.

A similar but contrasting global network-in-the-making is analyzed by Annelise Riles (1998), who studied women's organizing in Fiji in preparation for the United Nations-sponsored international conference on women in Beijing in 1995. The women she studied had formed non-governmental organizations addressing gendered concerns; these organizations were connected to sister organizations, funders, and other kinds of political supporters all over the world. What they learned from this system of ties, Riles shows, is the importance of "networks," that is, webs of imagined interconnection through which groups in one area were to exchange information and support with other groups on what was seen as an egalitarian, voluntary basis. Riles argues that networks took on a formal aesthetic value, and through this formalism, the Fijian women organizers saw themselves as part of an emergent global process.

These two globe-making projects have a lot in common. Both have educational goals to teach people to visualize a future globalism in which "networks"--rather than nations or bureaucracies--will be the organizing aesthetic. Both value personal contacts over long distances and individual initiative over the recognition of pre-set roles. Yet it is also clear that each project has come into being along a different historical trajectory, with different material and political resources and objectives, and their convergence is broken by those differences. As Rouse shows, MCI's presentation of their product as a "network" separates wealthy professionals (i.e., those in the network) from the underpaid workers and other poor people to whom they have some responsibility in the public space of the nation. Only through this separation can they build a constituency for the global mobility of corporate resources and the wealthy niche-marketing of corporate products. The globalization this network promotes, then, is one that ties privileged consumers and their corporate sponsors in a self-conscious forgetting about the rest of the world. In contrast, the NGO networks discussed by Riles are intended to build a transnational women's solidarity that brings women's rights into particular national contexts, rather than excluding network-builders from participation in nations. Attention to national and regional "levels" of network building is supposed to strengthen the call of public responsibilities within these units, rather than eviscerate them. Even as they bypass state

bureaucracies, the women are called upon to act as national representatives; in this capacity, Riles argues, the Fijian women bring national cultural sensibilities to the imagination of global network activities by focusing on a formal aesthetics grounded in other Fijian cultural work (Riles 1998).

One further striking contrast between these two images of the network is their differential gender content. MCI's network, as Rouse explains it, rescues vulnerable young girls through the patriarchal security of a privatized globe. The Fijian women's NGO network creates new arenas of all-female sociality that draw upon but extend local forms in transnational translations. The contrast provides rich grounds for thinking about emergent forms of subjectivity and agency in varied global projects. There is a lot going on, and it doesn't all match up. Were we to limit ourselves to one of these visions as a description of the new global landscape, we would miss the pleasures and dangers of this multiplicity. Furthermore, we might overvalorize connection and circulation rather than attending to the shifting, contested making of channels and landscape elements.

## CIRCULATION

Interconnection is everything in the new globalisms. And interconnection is created through circulation. Many things are said to circulate, ranging from people to money, cultures to information, television programs to international protocols to the process called globalization itself. "Circulation" is in global rhetoric what the "penetration" of capitalism was in certain kinds of Marxist world-systems theory: the way powerful institutions and ideas spread geographically and come to have an influence in distant places. The difference is significant; where penetration always evoked a kind of rape, a forcing of some people's powerful interests on to other people, circulation calls forth images of the healthy flow of blood in the body, and the stimulating, even-handed exchange of the marketplace.

Both bodies and markets as models for understanding social process have been much criticized in social theory in the twentieth century. Images of society as organically interconnected like a body were important in establishing the social sciences, but they have been largely discredited as disallowing the study of power, meaning, conflict, disjuncture, and historical change [refs??]. Images of society as a market have had a different kind of lasting power. Caught up in the endorsement of capitalism as an economic system and free trade as its ideal political context, they have been revived and given new authority in celebration of the end of communism and the Cold War. Marxist scholarship, however, continues a substantial record of criticism of these images. Market models assume a "level playing field" of exchange that erases the inequalities of property and the processes of exploitation of labor. Market models appear to be inclusive, but they privilege those social actors who, because of their economic resources, are able to participate in markets. Most importantly in the context of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for market models, Marxist scholars have shown how bourgeois governments and social institutions have promoted market thinking to naturalize class and other social distinctions. By training the attention of citizens on the equalities and opportunities of circulation and exchange, they justify policies of domination and discrimination. Recent endorsements of "global circulation" as the process that is making the future partake in the obfuscations of inequality for which market models are known.

Global circulation is not just a rhetoric of corporate expansion, however. Leftist

social commentators often find as much good use for circulation models as capitalist apologists. Circulation is used to discuss the breaking down of oppressive barriers between cultures, races, languages, and nations, including immigration restrictions and segregation policies. Diasporas circulate, bringing the wealth of their cultural heritage to new locations. Authoritarian regimes prevent the circulation of information, inspiring democratic movements to create underground channels of flow. The circulation of film inspires creative viewing practices. Circulation is thus tapped for the endorsement of multicultural enrichment, freedom, mobility, communication, and creative hybridity.

In part, the acceptability of circulation rhetoric among liberal and leftist social scientists derives from a self-conscious rejection of the Marxist emphasis on capitalist production and its consequent de-emphasis on market exchange and consumption (e.g., Baudrillard; Appadurai; Miller). Leftist critics of corporate globalization point to the importance of marketing and consumption in contemporary corporate strategies for reaching out to new fields of operation (e.g. Jameson 1998a); these are topics that need to be discussed. The growth of managerial and service professions (e.g., Ong 199x; Sassen 1998) also calls out to critics to abandon an exclusive analytic focus on factory production to attend to the variety of economic forms of contemporary capitalism.

The form and variety of capitalist economic activities is not, however, the only issue to raise about the use of the rhetoric of circulation as a ruling image for global interconnections. There are hidden relations of production here that may have nothing to do with labor in factories: the making of the objects and subjects who circulate, the channels of circulation, and the landscape elements that enclose and frame those channels. A focus on circulation shows us the movement of people or things or ideas or institutions, but it does not show us how this movement depends on defining tracks and grounds and scales and units of agency. This blindness may not be inherent in the idea of circulation itself but due to the kinds of circulations that have delineated the model, which, for historically layered political reasons, have been particularly closed to attention to struggles over the terrain of circulation and the privileging of certain kinds of people as players. We focus on the money--the ur object of flow--instead of the social conditions that allow or encourage that flow. If we imagined creeks, perhaps the model would be different; we might notice the channel as well as the water moving.

In this spirit, Saskia Sassen has addressed channel making in relation to global circulations of corporate communications as well as labor (1998). She argues that "global cities" have developed as centers for transnational corporate operations because of the density of corporate real estate, professional service workers, and telecommunication connection grids. Corporate rhetoric aspires to an infinite decentralization and deterritorialization of management operations, but this rhetoric ignores the material requirements for dispersed communication, e.g., telephone and computer connections, as well as the specialized labor of advertising, finance, and other services, all of which is concentrated in particular cities. The much-touted mobility of information, capital, products, and production facilities depends on these coordinating centers. Similarly, Sassen shows that immigration, often discussed as the mass product of individual mobility, requires the creation of institutional ties linking sending and receiving areas. Histories of direct foreign investment or military intervention, for example, have predictably produced flows of immigrants from the targetted regions to the United States. "Flow" is movement stimulated through political and economic channels.

Sassen's work shows that the alternatives to conventional models of circulation are not just to close off our attention to travel and trade. Analysts can also examine the material and institutional infrastructure of movement and pay special attention to the economic coercions and political guarantees that limit or promote circulation. In order to do this, however, we would need to redefine the common distinction between the "local" and the "global." Most commonly, globalist thinkers imagine the local as the stopping point of global circulations. It is the place where global flows are consumed, incorporated, and resisted (Pred and Watts??). It is the place where global flows fragment and are transformed into something place-bound and particular (Wilson and Dissanayake 1996a). But if flow itself always involves making terrain, there can be no territorial distinctions between the "global" transcending of place and the "local" making of places. Instead, there is place making--and travel--all around, from New York to New Guinea.

Place making is always a cultural as well as a political-economic activity. It involves assumptions about the nature of those subjects authorized to participate in the process and the kinds of claims they can reasonably put forth about their position in national, regional, and world classifications and hierarchies of places. The specificities of these subjects and claims contradict and misstate those of other place makers, even as they may form overlaps and links imaged as "flows." The channel-making activity of circulation, then, is always a contested and tentative formation of scales and landscapes. To avoid letting those who imagine themselves as winners call all of the terms, we need to attend to the missed encounters, clashes, misfires, and confusions that are as much part of global linkages as simple "flow."

Culture, specificity, and place-making have conventionally been the domain of the discipline of anthropology, particularly as practiced in the United States. Since these kinds of issues are so often missing from discussions of the global, the stakes are particularly high in seeing their incorporation into global questions in anthropology. Yet it is not these issues that first chaperoned globalism into U.S. anthropology. Instead, the charisma of the global was introduced to forward a disciplinary transition away from an overzealous and non-reflective localism. It is from the perspective of this trajectory that it is possible to examine the specific disciplinary practices through which globalist frameworks are being read by U.S. anthropologists.

### Readings in anthropology

Social science globalisms take particular forms in relation to disciplinary reading and discussion practices. They gain their influence not only because they are adopted in the work of articulate practitioners but, equally importantly, because they enter local trajectories of disciplinary momentum. They are rebuilt to speak to disciplinary challenges, as these, in turn, are understood in relation to specific social locations of scholarly practice. In the process, social science globalisms pick up regional and disciplinary frameworks and assumptions, even as they throw themselves as objections against others. In examining how globalisms have transformed U.S. anthropology, then, the work of particular authors is relevant as it is reviewed and digested within located reading practices.

Anthropologists do not merely mimic the understandings of globalism of other

experts, even as they are influenced by them. No anthropologist I know argues that the global future will be culturally homogeneous; disciplinary concern with cultural diversity overrides the elsewhere-pervasive rhetoric of global cultural unification. Furthermore, in the United States, anthropologists discuss globalism in relation to a rather "local" disciplinary heritage: a more than twenty-five year journey away from analyses of "cultures" as autonomous, self-generating, and bounded entities. In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. anthropologists criticized the discipline's complicity with colonial projects of conquest and administration. Historical, anti-colonial, and world-systems frameworks moved to the discipline's center, ousting functionalism, and interpretive accounts of national and nationalist commitments replaced descriptions of isolated cultures. In the 1980s, ethnographic research and description were interrogated for their role in making cultures appear isolated, and U.S. anthropologists recommitted themselves to more open, reflexive, and textually responsive ways of approaching the inequalities and interconnections among people and places. The recent turn to the global takes its alignment within this pathway of disciplinary self-criticism.

Globalism within this trajectory renews stereotypes of the anthropological past in order to confront them. The "old" anthropology imagined here described cultures so grounded that they could not move out of place. This anthropology imprisons its objects in a cell; interconnection and movement in the form of "global flows" are thus experienced as a form of liberation. Furthermore, these flows fit most neatly inside the discipline when, in deference to past teachers and conventions, the boundedness of past cultures goes unchallenged; global flows can then take the discipline, and the world, into a freer future.

This "freeing-up" variety of globalism is both exhilarating and problematic. On the one hand, it shows us new dreams and schemes of world-making; on the other, as an aspect of its liberatory project, it also turns attention away from the quirky eccentricities of culture and history that have perhaps been U.S. anthropology's most vital contribution to critical thought. In the process, too, anthropologists tend to endorse the globalist dreams of the people they study, and thus we lose the opportunity to address the located specificity of those globalist dreams.

In the spirit of liberating the discipline, the three features I discussed as creating the charisma of social science globalisms are prominent in U.S. anthropological readings. Each has been endorsed for good "local" reasons and has done productive work for the discipline. Yet the very enthusiasm that each of these features has provoked has made it easier to erase the specificities of the work that it can do, creating a misleading portrait of a single global future. It is hard not to universalize a globalist framework. But let me see if I can locate these globalisms--and in the process get them to do some very different work.

## FUTURISM

U.S. anthropologists come to an endorsement of a singular global future from their interest in the macro-economic context of cultural diversity. An important part of the disciplinary trajectory away from the study of isolated cultures has been attention to the capitalist world system. In appreciating the pervasiveness of capitalism, anthropologists have been able to show how even out-of-the-way and exotic cultures respond to common and contemporary political-economic challenges. This is crucial

work. At the same time, risks and dilemmas remain in this analysis: In turning one's gaze to the systemic features of world capitalism, it is easy to lose track of the cultural and historical specificity of particular capitalist niches. In coming to terms with the transnational scope of contemporary finance, marketing, and production, it is easy to endorse globalism as a predictive frame. Indeed, it is in this context that anthropologists most commonly imagine singular global futures. Even as critics, we are caught in the hyperboles imagined by advocates of neoliberalism, structural adjustment, and transnationalization.

Particularly in its critical versions, this global future forms part of a narrative of the evolution of stages of capitalism. Furthermore, most anthropologists attracted by this narrative take their model from a single source: David Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Within much globalist anthropology, Harvey's book establishes the fact of epochal change, laying the ground for global futurism. Yet I find this a particular, peculiar reading of Harvey, and it is worth considering in its own right: For anthropologists, Harvey provides the evidence for a new era. As readers, they pick out "flexible accumulation" and "space-time compression" as the characteristics of this new era.

Yet when I turn to Harvey's book, it seems to me that the central argument is that the "cultural aesthetic" of postmodernism is related to the economic logic of flexible accumulation. The first section of the book reviews modernism and postmodernism as trends in the arts and letters, including architecture and philosophy. This is "capital-C" culture: a genealogy of great men and their ideas. The second section of the book turns to the economic "regimes of accumulation" of Fordism and post-Fordist "flexible accumulation." The book's original idea is to juxtapose these two bodies of literature, and to argue that postmodernism mirrors post-Fordism. It takes a certain amount of economic determinism to make this argument, in which capital-C culture acts as a mirror of economic realities.

But in this gap, space and time come in. For Harvey, the "experience" of space and time mediate between Culture and the (non-culturally organized) economy.

For me the space-and-time section is the least satisfying section of the book. Harvey describes categories for understanding human encounters with space and time, representations of space and time in the arts and letters--and, in one chapter, in two films, and anecdotes about space and time in the capitalist workplace. No ethnographic sources for understanding spatial and temporal texture or diversity are consulted. The concept of "experience" is never explained. Since the mirror relation between arts and letters and the economy has already been established, their mediation by experience is a formal requirement, needing no substantiation.

In this context, it is strange that anthropologists so often pick only "the acceleration of space-time compression" along with "flexible accumulation" out of this book. In the process of citation, too, the book's tone changes. As I read it, Harvey's book is polemical. He ranges over a wide variety of scholarship to show a novel set of interconnections and to criticize postmodern aesthetics. This is not a science experiment but rather a book-length essay. Yet somehow it comes to have the status of a fact when drawn into globalist anthropology. Harvey brings with him the ability to read economics, a skill few anthropologists have developed. It may be that anthropologists ignore the

discussion of aesthetics, thinking they know more about culture than he does, and go for the accumulation strategy and associated space-time requirements, because this feels like the macro-economic facts that are outside of their knowledge base.

The result is that a selection of Harvey's terms are used to build a non-cultural and non-situated futurist framework, "beyond culture" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). One set of problems derives from the attempt to make this future global; as anthropologist Michael Kearney admits, Harvey's thesis is "not dealing with globalization per se" (1995:551). Indeed, Harvey has a distinct blindness for everything outside dominant northern Cultures and economies; to make his story applicable to north-south articulations is not impossible, but a challenge. Another set of problems seems even more intractable. If we drop Harvey's discussion of aesthetics (as Culture) but still ignore the ethnographic sources through which anthropologists identify culture, just how do we know the shape of space and time? The pared-down Harvey-readings preferred by anthropologists have lost even literary and filmic representations of temporal and spatial processes; we are left with economic facts. Without "Culture" or "culture", we must assume speed-up, fragmentation, compression, and globality; certainly, we can't consult either popular or official representations, discourses, or cultural practices.

Anthropological analysis, which could look at scale-making claims and representations in conjunction with the social processes that support and result from those claims and representations, becomes reduced to building starships on millennial fantasies. Harvey has written a stimulating and original book; it doesn't have to be used this way.

One way Harvey could be used is to scale back its epochal claims to look at some limited but powerful alliances between aesthetics and economics. Harvey's claim that postmodernism and flexible accumulation have something to do with each other could be pursued by locating patterns and players more specifically. This kind of project, however, diminishes the excitement of another globalist reading practice, which I have called "conflations." Let me examine how this practice both brings to life and impoverishes the anthropology of global interconnection.

## CONFLATIONS

Not all anthropological globalism is engaged in understanding the systemics of capitalism; another significant sector attempts to hold on to "culture" as an anthropological object while showing its increased contemporary mobility and range. In this genre, anthropologists have done exciting work in beginning to specify modes of cultural interconnection that tie people in far flung locales or travel with them across heterogeneous terrains. Much of this work offers the promising possibility of attention to regionalisms and histories of place-making within an appreciation of interconnection. However, to the extent that it has been harnessed for the search for a singular anthropological globalism, it has become subject to readings in which the differences among places and perspectives have been blurred to emphasize the break from past localisms. Many readers read globalist anthropologists as an undifferentiated crowd. Thus they lose the opportunity to explore disjunction and dialogue among the separate globalisms advocated by various analysts.

Might a different kind of reading practice re-establish the potential for appreciating multiple, overlapping, and sometimes contractory globalisms? Consider, for example, contrasts among the globalisms of Arjun Appadurai (1996), Ulf Hannerz

(1996), and Michael Kearney (1996). I choose these authors because each has elaborated his ideas about globalism in a book-length exposition (as cited above). Each cares about the disciplinary trajectory of anthropology and sees his work as advancing that trajectory. They acknowledge each other, and their positions overlap: They are all concerned with migrants and travellers and the worlds they make and are made by; they argue that new analytic tools are necessary for new times; the frameworks they advocate in each case are an advance beyond the anthropology of separate, segregated cultures and societies.

Yet they conjure rather different global geographies. The globality of Hannerz, the "global ecumene" (1989), is a space of interaction among once-separate cultures now growing in dialogue and mutual acknowledgement. Its creolization is created by cultural flows, and particularly flows from powerful centers to less powerful peripheries; it is carried and extended by cosmopolitans who, of necessity, acknowledge and extend European and North American cultural frameworks even as they incorporate and remake non-Western cultures. Center-periphery relations thus organize world culture (1996).

In contrast, Kearney's postmodern globality is a critique of center-periphery frameworks, which Kearney identifies with the classificatory modernist era that has passed away as we have entered transnational hyperspace and non-teleological, postdevelopmental time. The key feature of the global era is the "implosion" of center and periphery, as distinctions between rural and urban as well as south and north disintegrate. Spatial and cultural discriminations become impossible in a world of global flows, as non-unitary migrant subjects are formed in the interstices of past classificatory principles. In the unruly "reticula" Kearney conjures, however, he retains a dialogue with Marxian political economy that gives his multiplicity of identities and geographies its shape. The organization of the transnational economy creates differences of class, power, and value that forge subaltern and dominant social niches of identity and agency.

In contrast again, Appadurai evokes a globality of contested "scapes" in which no single organizing principle rules. "Financescapes," which include capital flows, are only one of several imaginative geographies that compete to make the globe; Appadurai finds that "ethnoscapes" and "mediascapes"--the cultural worlds conjured by migrants and in movies, respectively--are more decisive features in the "rupture" of the global era, with its heightened dependence on the imagination. Like Kearney's, Appadurai's globalism refuses center-periphery frames, but like Hannerz, he situates it squarely in modernity's world-wide cultural spread, rather than post-modernism's epistemological disruptions. Appadurai's globalism refuses Kearney's sociology of migrants to foreground their cultural worlds; indeed, these kinds of cultural terrains, although ungrounded in space, are those criticized by Kearney as modernist classificatory tricks.

Different subjects are at the center of each of these understandings of the global. Indeed, one of the most exciting things about these anthropological discussions of the global is the author's work, in each case, to situate his theoretical apparatus around the activities and self-perceptions of these subjects. Appadurai imagines global scapes from the perspective of his attention to the Indian diaspora and its cultural world. Kearney theorizes from his encounter with Miztec "postpeasants": Mexican Indian farmers who have become migrants selling crafts in San Diego parking lots. Hannerz is concerned about cosmopolitans, world travellers, journalists, and city people everywhere; he returns often to his knowledge about Africa. These varied subjects each assist the authors in evoking different globalisms.

Diasporas, almost by definition, conjure deterritorialized areas, worlds of meaning and "home" feeling detached from original territorial boundaries--like Appadurai's scapes. This kind of self-consciousness about the making of cultural worlds contrasts sharply with the cultural commitments of cosmopolitans and poor migrants, as these create focal knowledges for Hannerz and Kearney, respectively. Both cosmopolitans and poor migrants erase the specificity of their cultural tracks, although for different reasons: Poor migrants need to fit in the worlds of others; cosmopolitans want more of the world to be theirs. Cosmopolitans, like diasporas, promote projects of world-making, but, as Hannerz stresses, the projects they endorse enlarge the hegemonies of northern centers even as they incorporate peripheries. In contrast, the world-making projects of southern diasporas and poor migrants form an oppositional accompaniment to northern hegemonies, limiting their attempts at universalization and criticizing their center-periphery perspective, as both Appadurai and Kearney do Hannerz's. Poor migrants, like those at the center of Kearney's globalism, are particularly aware of their need to survive--politically, economically, and culturally--in worlds that others have made; the imagination is never enough for them to create autonomy and self-determination. Thus, Kearney refuses Appadurai's imagination-ruled scapes (1995:553), while Appadurai and Hannerz, thinking through diasporas and cosmopolitans, respectively, stress the world-making power of imaginative perspectives.

The regional specificities of these focal knowledges may also be relevant to the globalisms imagined through them: I think of the strength of the culture and media industries of India and its diaspora, the self-consciousness about northern cultural impositions of cosmopolitan Africans, and the centrality of transnational capitalism in Latin American studies. It also may be suggestive to compare all these knowledges with other angles for thinking about contemporary cultural processes. Consider, for example, U.S. minority groups who have demanded protection from the nation state against cultural and political discrimination; thinking through U.S. minority culture provides a less fertile ground than the diasporas, poor migrants, and cosmopolitans I have been considering to imagine an inclusively post-national era.

These differences do not make any of these perspectives wrong; my point is to show that these are differences that matter theoretically.

Each of the perspectives I have been describing seems valid and important. It is particularly useful that each of these authors has worked to situate his theories in relation to the history of his knowledge and experience with specific people and events. This work allows their readers to take a further step to think about that world in which the respective focal knowledges on which they each draw could all exist, whether in competition or alliance, in mutual acknowledgement or erasure, in misunderstanding or in dialogue.

Appadurai's idea about the importance of imaginative "scapes" is vital to this task. Appadurai stresses disjunction among varied perspectives; he stresses the importance of the imagination in forming competing notions of geography and scale. His framework seems well suited for thinking about the relationship of varied globalist perspectives. Yet imaginative landscapes come in many kinds, and this diversity may be more useful to understanding disjunction than a division into functional domains of ethnicity, technology, finance, media, and ideology, as these posit a singular formula for "society." If instead of hegemonic domain-divisions, we turned to the social and cultural struggles

through which imaginative visions came to count as "scapes" at all, we might be able to incorporate disjunction not only among domains but also among varied and contested kinds of imaginative landscape-making in this framework. We might then contrast the cultural world of the Indian diaspora with other globalist scapes. Thus, for example, Paula Ebron has shown the importance of history-and-memory landscapes for African-American regional and global claims (1998; n.d.); she traces these landscapes through many formats of discussion, which both enter and interrupt Appadurai's cinema-based "mediascape" domain. Moving beyond what a list of globally-settled "scapes" can tell us, we need to study how scales, geographies, new eras and other imaginative terrains are differentially and dialogically made, negotiated, refused, or erased.

Hannerz's attention to the cultural specificity of cosmopolitanisms seems particularly important to assess the power and limitations of such claims about scale, era, and geography without subsuming one's own analysis under the truths of their perspective. Hannerz reminds us that certain imaginative landscapes are particularly powerful, especially those that "make people from western Europe and North America feel as much at home as possible" (1996:107). He is right to stress their power. Yet these powerful perspectives do not necessarily determine the cultural evolution of the whole world, or its globality; the key is to situate them in relation to both the political economies that make them possible and the struggles over meaning in which they participate.

In the process of putting global perspectives in situated dialogue, the political economy engaged (if not often endorsed) by Kearney is appropriate and essential. Imaginative landscapes mobilize an audience through their material and institutional resources. Yet, as discussed in the previous section, it is also difficult to give full attention to such mobilizations with a theory of the singular evolution of a monolithic capitalism.

As J.K. Gibson-Graham argues (1996), models that predict the stages of capitalism bow to the ideology of a single world-capitalist system rather than investigating its heterogeneous complexities. Instead, Kearney's concern with the changing political economy, like that of David Harvey, might point us toward an investigation of shifting cultural developments within the surprisingly diverse frame of capitalism.

The innovations of these approaches are not served well, however, by an over-reliance on a vocabulary of "flows."

## CIRCULATION

"Circulation" has a deep genealogy in anthropology. I keep waiting to find an author who takes me through this legacy, perhaps tracing their thoughts from French structuralist "exchange" through global "flows." But I have not yet found that author. Instead, it has become easy for anthropologists to talk about global circulations as a sign of everything new and future-making.

Circulations are said to be what we are able to study as global. George Marcus is informative and clear about this in the introduction to the series of essays he edited as *Rereading Cultural Anthropology* (1992). Under the heading "Circulations," he says, "The other major related trend that concerns contemporary global transformations is a move out from local situations to understand how transcultural processes themselves are constituted in the world of the so-called "system" (modern interlocking institutions of

media, markets, states, industries, universities--the worlds of elites and middle classes) that has encapsulated, transformed, and sometimes obliterated local cultures. This work examines the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space. It shows how the global arena is itself constituted by such circulations" (1992:xiii, my emphasis).

Circulations define the newness of the global epoch. Michael Kearney's review "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism" offers a useful statement of this. His field is the study of movement, both population movement and "the movement of information, symbols, capital, and commodities in global and transnational spaces. . . . Special attention is given to the significant contemporary increases in the volume and velocity of such flows for the dynamics of communities and for the identities of their members" (1995:547).

Newness is defined by increased flow. And because authors and readers focus on the excitement of this newness, there has been almost no discussion about the implied dichotomies here: circulation versus stagnation; new versus old. Does the newness and globality of movement mean that once-immobile "local" places have recently been transcended by "global" flow? If analysts must "move out of local situations" to find circulation, there must be some local folks who are still stuck inside them, being stagnant. These imagined stagnant locals are excluded from the new circulating globality, which leaves them outside, just as progress and modernity were imagined as leaving so many behind. And, just as frameworks of race, region, and religion defined those excluded from the idea of progress, here we must consider what new Orientalisms will define who is in and who is out of circulation. Furthermore, if circulation is new, was the old static and segregated? Were there really, after all, isolated autonomous cultures out there until the circulations of the last few years? Each of these misleading dichotomies would encourage analysts to resurrect that very anthropology that has been criticized and reworked for the last twenty-five years: the anthropology that fixed and segregated cultures. But in each case, it would be resurrected only for special cases: the marginal, the past. A globalist anthropology of movement would reign at the center.

This won't do. To move beyond the contrast between past and local stability and present-future global flow, we need to examine different modes of regional-to-global interconnection.

The new attention to global circulation responds to real changes in the world--and in anthropology as practiced in the United States. Anthropologists once set out to study "communities"; they thought they could find society and culture within a relatively narrowly defined social sphere. For some years, it has seemed difficult to do anthropology without paying attention to much wider ranging objects of study: national visions, elite networks, popular culture, social movements, state policies, histories of colonial thinking, and much more. One piece of the excitement of contemporary anthropology involves new ideas about how to do fieldwork on these complex objects. We rush into interdisciplinary social theory to find innovative, project-oriented suggestions. In this process, it is easy to endorse frameworks of globalization that transcend the limitations of site-oriented, local research. Instead, I am arguing that we can study the landscape of circulation as well as the flow. How are people, cultures, and things remade as they travel?

## Scale as an object of analysis

To understand the institutional proliferation of particular globalization projects requires a sense of their cultural specificities as well as the travels and interactions through which these projects are reproduced and taken on in new places. In thinking about where one would begin a globally informed investigation of local and global processes that avoided the pitfalls I have been discussing, I might begin with those categories and approaches most neglected by unself-conscious reliance on global futurism, globalist conflation, and global circulation. I offer four examples of such starting points:

**Scale making.** Certainly, a key issue in assuming a critical perspective on global claims and processes is the making of scales--not just the global, but also local and regional scales of all sorts. Through what social and material processes and cultural commitments do localities or globalities come, tentatively, into being? How are varied regional geographies made real? Globalism's automatic association of particular scales with particular eras makes it very difficult to notice the details and idiosyncrasies of scale making; thus more the reason to foreground this issue. It also seems true, however, that globalism intervenes at a moment in the social sciences in which there has been much excellent work on the making of "local communities" as well as "nations"; it even seems possible that this scholarship has made social science globalism more possible, through its attention to the effervescence of these imagined stabilities. In bringing forward the new importance of the globe as a unit of interaction, globalism has been less self-conscious about scale making, and it is here that intervention seems particularly necessary. And, since the globe is a region made large, asking about the making of global scale brings forward questions of the various forms of region making that both facilitate and interrupt global claims.

**Close encounters.** Where circulation models have tended to focus only on message transmission, one might instead investigate interactions involving collaboration, misunderstanding, opposition, and dialogue. Attention to these processes provides an alternative to the conflation of varied scale-making claims, projects, and agents. One literature that has become unusually attentive to mixed encounters is the literature on transnational social movements, which require coalitions among extremely various kinds of people, with disparate goals and perceptions of the issues at hand.

To understand even momentary successes of this kind of motley coalition, analysts must attend to the changing definitions of "interests" and "identity" that both allow and result from collaborative activities. They must focus on the historical specificity of the events that resulted in alliance and the open-ended indeterminacy of the regional processes stimulated by that alliance. These are useful reminders in rethinking transnational interactions.

It is not just in transient and defensive social movements, however, that it is important to look for social processes sparked by coalitions, dialogues, missed messages, and oppositional refusals. In considering developments in transnational capitalism, this kind of attention can offer an alternative to the blindfolded dedication to a singular unfolding economic logic that has characterized so much globalist analysis. If we investigate the series of historically specific collaborations that create distinctive cultural forms of capitalism, we might better appreciate global heterogeneity.

Definitional struggles. Circulation imagery can draw attention away from the transformation of actors, objects, goals, perspectives, and terrains that characterizes regional-to-global interaction. Instead, we might pay special attention to the roles of both cultural legacies and power inequalities in creating the institutional arenas and assumptions of world-making transitions. Every globalization project is shaped from somewhat unpredictable interactions among specific cultural legacies. Furthermore, the cultural frames and assumptions of globalization projects cannot be understood without attention to multiple levels of political negotiations, with their idiosyncratic and open-ended histories. "Definitional struggles" call attention to how these arenas are designed and the politics of their development. They can remind us that globalization both requires and exceeds the work of particularly positioned and repositioned globalizers.

Concrete trajectories and engagements. In contrast to the abstract globe conjured by social science globalism, the scholarship I am imagining would stress the concreteness of "movements" in both senses of the word: social mobilizations in which new identities and interests are formed, and travels from one place to another through which place-transcending interactions occur. These two senses of movement work together in remaking geographies and scales. Tracing them concretely offers more insight into planetary complexity than the endorsement of a heterogeneous globalism whose features ricochet helplessly between an imagined spreading global dynamism and its contained local Other.

In globalization theories, we have confused what should be questions about the global ramifications of new technologies and social processes into answers about global change. Each of the starting points I have suggested offers an attempt to reverse this globalist thinking to turn concerns about the global back into researchable questions.

#### Release

Many globalists agree that their endorsement of a self-consciously paranoid vision of total transformation involves intellectual and political choices to glimpse the hopes and terrors of the new world order it promises.

My refusal of this crafted paranoia is similarly a matter of intellectual and political stakes. In part, I worry that the people, places, and perspectives I have thought the most about are ignored or distorted into narrow stereotypes in most globalization theory.

It is almost predictable, then, that everything I have argued will be summarized as a call for more attention to "local" diversity. I think diversity is important, and this stops me from fighting with those who offer this reduction. Yet I have been trying to say more than this. I share interest in diversity with every global anthropologist and other global scholars too. Where I have been trying to push the conversation is in examining some basic assumptions of globalism, and using them to form a critical perspective, rather than a blinding endorsement, of projects for making a future imagined as global.

Anthropologists have been critics of theories of global homogenization; at the same time, those who have joined the argument with globalization theorists have been influenced by the terms of debate to accept most of the premises of these theories in order to join the conversation at all. The argument against global cultural unification has encouraged anthropologists to agree that we are indeed entering an era properly called

global, although that era, according to anthropologists, is characterized by cultural divergences as much as unification. In the embrace of the argument, the cultural divergence we find must be part of the globalist phenomenon.

This is not, I think, a useful place to be stuck. To get out of its grip, analysts need to give up several of the tools and frames we have found most easy to work with, perhaps because they resound so nicely with popular "common sense" at least in the United States. First, we might stop making a distinction between "global" forces and "local" places. This is a very seductive set of distinctions, promising as it does to give us both focused detail and the big picture, and I find myself slipping into this vocabulary all the time. But it draws us into globalist fantasies by obscuring the ways that the cultural processes of all "place" making and all "force" making are both local and global, that is, both socially and culturally particular and productive of widely spreading interactions. Through these terms, global "forces" gain the power to cause a total rupture that takes over the world.

Second, we might learn to investigate new developments without assuming either their universal extension or their fantastic ability to draw all world-making activities into their grasp. International finance, for example, has surely undergone striking and distinctive transformations in the last thirty years. Certainly this has effects everywhere, but what these effects are is unclear. It seems unlikely to me that a single logic of transformation is being produced--or a singular moment of rupture.

Third, globalisms themselves need to be interrogated as an interconnected, but not homogeneous, set of projects--with their distinctive cultural commitments and their powerful but limited presence in the world. Critical studies of modernization projects may provide some thought-provoking examples of analytic direction here.

Freed up in these ways, it might be possible to attend to global visions without imagining their world hegemony. Outside the thrall of globalization, a more nuanced and surprising appreciation of the making and remaking of geography might yet be possible.

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